DEP Discussion 1 Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

DEP Discussion 1 - Assignment Example They were the ones who helped me in learning about sexual matters and my attraction towards the opposite gender and why these feelings were taking place. At this point in life I started idealizing and listening to rock music and from that time onwards I developed a taste for rock music and to date rock music has not only become the main music choice, it has even defined the way I dress and act. My interest in rock music even defined my personality which is quite aggressive in nature. Another part of development in this age was my relationship with my parents. At this age I used to believe that my parents are quite old fashioned and things are not as they perceive and due to this we used to have a conflict. My parents did not reject me and rather accepted my state of mind and confusion that I was facing and they helped me through that time period and became my close friends instead of being authoritarian. The major difference between development in young adulthood and adolescent is th at during adolescent individuals are more focused on their physical development, but during young adulthood individuals start being concerned about their future career and what kind of a future they want to experience. Furthermore, during young adulthood social bonds become stronger and those individuals who become friends during this age lasts for a longer period of time and may even last throughout the life of an

Effects of Health Inequalities on Infant Mortality

Effects of Health Inequalities on Infant Mortality Health and social policy assignment Introduction Longest (2002), the Health Policy Institute Director at the University of Pittsburgh in the United States, states that †Public policies are authoritative decisions made at the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government †¦ (which are) †¦ intended to direct or influence the action, behaviors, or decisions of others†¦Ã¢â‚¬  He continues, â€Å"When public policies pertain to or influence our pursuit of health †¦ then †¦ they become health policies.† (Longest, 2002). Longest vision of health policy is seen in United Kingdom as well as Europe in the same manner as â€Å"†¦ view of public health activism that sees little distinction between health policy and public policy as a whole† (Randall, 2000, p. 8). Petersen and Lupton (1996, p. xii) describe the new public health as â€Å"†¦ at its core a moral enterprise, in that it involves prescriptions about how we should live our lives individually and collectively†, which represent an approach that is much like Monnet’s plans for Europe (Fontaine, 1994, p. 12), which explains the European health policy as it exists today. As a unitary state, the United Kingdom’s central government directs most activity representing government functions. Social policy applies to those policies that governments utilize for welfare as well as social protection, the manner and ways via which welfare is devised and developed, and the academic study of social policy (Robert Gordon University, 2006). Social policy, in its primary sense is concerned with the welfare state and social services, and in its broader context represents the range of issues that extended beyond governmental actions, including the means that welfare is promoted as well as the economic and social conditions shaping its development (Robert Gordon University, 2006). William Beveridge offered the citizens of the United Kingdom â€Å"†¦ a blueprint for social advance and a modern caring state †¦Ã¢â‚¬  which would provide for citizens â€Å"†¦ from cradle to grave† (Randall, 2000, p. 5) which were foundations of the welfare st ate that Britain briefly embarked on after World War II that offered full employment, a minimum national safety net, free and equal access to health and education, and a state provision for welfare. The Beveridge Report aimed at the elimination what was termed the ‘five giants’ of want, ignorance, idleness, squalor and disease, which he believed â€Å"†¦ construed an investment to facilitate a healthier workforce that would be able to promote productivity† (Gormley, 1999, p. 31). Beveridge’s vision helped to serve as the foundation for the later development of the National Health Service. The National Health Service came into being in 1946 by the UK Minister of Health and enacted through the National Health Service Act 1946, the National Health Service â€Å"†¦ was created by a national consensus within Britain† (Rintala, 2003, p. 3). Prior to its creation patients in the United Kingdom generally were responsible for paying for their health care services with free treatment sometimes available at hospital that taught as well as charitiable hospitals (Gormley, 1999, pp. 14 – 21). As a country, the United Kingdom â€Å"†¦ has a long history of offering some form of assistance for the sick, destitute and poverty-stricken† (Gormley, 1999, p. 13). Evidence of the foregoing is found under the National Insurance Act of 1911 a small deduction was taken from wage payments, 4d, that was also aided by employer contributions, 3d, and the government of the UK contributed 2d (Spartacus Educational, 2007). Workers received free medical service as well as being guaranteed a payment of 7s per week for a term of fifteen weeks when unemployed that were paid at Labour Exchanges that also posted notices regarding job vacancies (Spartacus Educational, 2007). Aneurin Bevan is credited as being the architect of the â€Å"†¦ successful implementation of the National Health Service †¦Ã¢â‚¬  as a result of his â€Å"†¦ personal political skills† (Gormley, 1999, p. 36). The NHS today is Britain’s largest employer, and is managed by the Department of Health, controlling the ten Strategic Health Authorities which have the responsibility for overseeing National Health Service activities in specific areas (Bevan, 2006). The Strategic Health Authorities have the responsibility for the strategic supervision of the 302 Primary Care Trusts that oversee the general practioners and dentists, 29,000 and 18,000 respectively, along with the commissioning of acute services from the private sector and other NHS Trusts (Bevan, 2006). The National Health Services Trusts number 290, representing 1,600 hospitals, and also falling under the supervision of the Strategic Health Authorities are the NHS Ambulance Services, Care Trusts and Mental Health Services Trusts (Bevan, 2006). The National Health Services broad and comprehensive program(s) includes Special Health Authorities, Blood and Transplant, Business Services Authority, National Treatment Agency, National Patient Safety Agency as well as the National Insitute for Health and Clinical Excellence (Bevan, 2006). This document shall critically analyse the inequalities in health care services as it relates to infant morality in Northern Ireland. As of 2006, the infant morality rate for all of Ireland stood at 5.3, and in Northern Ireland stood at just under 6 in 2001 (Bureau for Vital Statistics, 2001) which is higher than the 5.1 for the United Kingdom, and a number of other European Countries (infroplease.com, 2007). The problem lies in the infant morality rate for children from the highly deprived areas who are fifty percent more likely to die in their first year than are babies from more affluent areas (BBC News, 2000). This is problematic in light of the provision for equal health care for all as mandated under the United Kingdom’s National Health Service. This examination of the health care system in Northern Ireland shall take into account why the infant morality rates are high as well as whether there are inequalities in the system and if so what they are and why they exist. The reason is to reach a determinatation as to the causes, and reasons for the higher infant morality rate as well as what is being done to reverse the occurance. The figures for infant morality in Northern Ireland have been showing a downward trend, yet the morality rates for infants from deprived areas indicates a mortality rate that is 50% higher than the overall average during the first year (BBC News, 2000). The signifacne of Tables 1 through 4 is to provide a foundational frameowrk from which to make comparisons of underlying reasons and facets attributing to higher infant mortality rates as a factor of inequalities to be discussed utilizing varied class, income, and other correlations. Table 1 – Neonatal Morality in Northern Ireland 1988 – 2003 (dhsspsni.gov.uk. 2004) Table 2 – Post-Neonatal Mortality in Northern Ireland 1988 – 2003 (dhsspsni.gov.uk. 2004) Table 3 – Infant Mortality in Northern Ireland 1988 – 2003 (dhsspsni.gov.uk. 2004) The preceding figures take on increased importance with regard to the nature of this examination when viewed in comparison to figures from other regions. Table 4 – Live Births, Stillbirths and Infant Deaths by Mother’s Country of Birth, 2005 (National Statistics, 2006) These figures represent the Northern Ireland population as a whole. An important facet in this examination is represented by economics. The region has a higher proportion of people that are receiving benefits for being out of work, large numbers who are not working and a larger population of low pay wage earners (Joseph Roundtree Foundation, 2006). In finding conducted by a study it was found that infants of lone mothers as well as those that belong to parents in manual social classes are of the highest risk regarding infant morality (Whitehead and Drever, 1999). They also found that the lives of babies has at the highest risk in lower income groups as tabulated by the numbers of live births, stillbirths, early neonatal, late neonatal and postnatal deaths for babies in all types of marriage and non-marriage circumstances (Whitehead and Drever, 1999). The ‘Black Report’ in 1980 presented the term ‘inequalities in health’ as a result of it uncovering the gap between the richest and the poorest concerning experiences in illness, life expectancy and accident rates (Unison, 2001). The broader context of inequality in health, which has bearing upon infant mortality rates is comprised of factors associated with access to quality services, along individual as well as group characteristics that can affect and or lead to unequal treatment and discrimination (Unison, 2001). The report by Unison (2001) also identified social and economic factors, broader economic and environmental societal conditions and risk factors that are a part of lower income lifestyles. These aspects directly affect not only the mothers, but also fathers of infants in that their personal health, choices before and during pregnancy may not constitute the best avenues to the development of healthy offspring. In addition the importance of prenat al care, treatments, diet, nutrition, exercise, abstinence from smoking, drinking, drugs and other damaging aspects is higher in the lower socioeconomic groups (Investing for Health, 2006). The report also drew attention to health inequalities as a factor of an individuals social class, gender, ethnic origin, religious beliefs, political opinion, marital status and sexual orientation that area aspects even though these discrimination potentials are addressed in Northern Ireland’s equality and human rights laws (Unison, 2001). The overall effects of the broader consideration, representing age as a facet in infant mortality rates is illustrated in the following Table: Table 5 – Standardised Mortality Rates for People Aged Under 75 (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) 1997 – 2001 1998 2002 The preceding clearly indicates the differences in mortality rates as referred to in the Unison (2001) study, as well as the underlying health / lifestyle aspects of smoking, drinking, nutrition, exercise and allied factors indicated by Investing for Health (2006). The Health, Social Services and Public Safety (2004) report indicated that life expectancy for mean and females in deprived areas represented 72.0 and 77.9 years as compared to the non-deprived males and females of 75.2 and 80.2 years. The preceding also reveals itself in infant mortality rates, as shown by the following: Table 6 – Infant Mortality Rates per 1,000 Live Births (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) The foregoing clearly indicates the vast differences as uncovered in the Unison (2001) and Health, Social Services and Public Safety (2004) reports where the infant morality rate in deprived areas is a staggering 23% higher. A factor in the overall causes and reasons attributing to higher infant mortality rates is also shown by the higher incidences of teenage pregnancy: Table 7 – Teenage Birth Rates per 1,000 Females Aged 13 – 19 (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) The preceding indicates a 70% deferential in2001, and 71% differential in 2002. Another factor in the higher deprived area infant mortality rates is immunization. Table 8 – Immunisation Uptake Rates, Children born in 1998 (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) Table 9 Immunisation Uptake Rates, Children born in 2001 (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) In seeking to equate the causes and reasons for the higher incidence of infant mortality rates in Northern Ireland as a result of socioeconomic class, and inequalities in health care, the facet of overall general admission rates for non maternity reasons represents a valid area to be explored. The rationale for the preceding is to seek to determine, in a general fashion, if the inequalities in infant mortality rates represents more of a factor of lifestyle, health and personal choices as opposed to inequalities in the health system with regard to treatment, discrimination and related factors that are much harder to prove as well as seeming less likely to be a broader system wide occurrence. Table 10 – Standardised Admission Rates (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) 2001 – 2002 2002 – 2003 From the preceding, the argument that inequalities in health care being available or offered to lower income or deprived individuals as a factor of race, martial status, or other discrimination aspects is not seemingly borne out by the above table. What this table does suggest is that there are increased health factors affecting this segment of the population that are more in keeping with poorer health lifestyle choices, nutrition, smoking, drinking and drugs. Further evidence of the preceding rational is supported by the waiting time for inpatient admissions that does not indicate a bias against lower income groups despite their higher incidence of health services utilization as shown in Table 11. And while the area of reference utilized for this aspect is not within the infant mortality confines, it does provide a general factor that does not seemingly support bias in treatment as a result of income, or social status. Table 11 – Waiting Times for Inpatient Admission Proportion of inpatient elective admission where the patient has waited more that 18 months, or 12 months for cardiac surgery (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) Further illustration that the health care system in Northern Ireland is not seemingly discriminating against individuals with a lower socioeconomic status, and or other facets of discrimination is indicated in the following Table: Table 12 – Median Ambulance Response Times (in minutes) (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) In further analising factors representing potentially inequalities in health care that contribute to higher rates of infant mortality, the following Table indicates that there is a higher incidence of mortality in rural wards, which are more likely to also be lower income: Table 13 – Infant Mortality Rates per 1,000 Live Births (Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2004) Further support for the contention that inequalities in infant mortality in Northern Ireland are seemingly more of a product of factors inherent in the lifestyles, living conditions, health choices and educational background of individuals from deprived wards as opposed to the NHS discriminating and or providing a lower quality of care was reported by the BBC (2000) which advised that the Institute of Public Health was holding a conference to examine ways in which the inequalities in health would be addressed, focusing on social circumstances to build more successful partnerships. One of the key aspects mentioned was that a survey found that babies born in deprived wards had a fifty percent higher incidence of death than those born in affluent areas (BBC, 2000). The report also indicated that males in the lower socioeconomic classifications have a higher incidence of dying younger and have higher chronic illnesses than males from managerial and or professional groups (BBC, 2000). The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (2005) in its ongoing concern regarding higher infant mortality rates in deprived wards has stated that poverty and educational levels of parents continues to represent the biggest threat in this area and that an improvement in poverty rates is an important area in reducing infant mortality. The consultation also pointed out that diet, nutrition, understanding of child symptoms and seeking medical assistance at the onset of problems along with better pre and post natal care are factors attributed to higher infant mortality in lower socioeconomic groups. The updated report found that the government of Northern Ireland has not provided core funding to broaden educational outreach programs aimed at educating mothers and families in the lower socioeconomic groups to the symptoms and dangers facing infants. It points to the lack of the preceding as a clear indication that the government does not consider this a priority (Institute of Public Health in Ireland, (2005). The consultation also advised that monitoring with respect to birth outcomes, vaccination rates, infectious diseases, institution and other facets need budgets to enable the health system to perform better follow up on children identified as living in or subject to these aspects to lower infant mortality rates. I t suggests that through increased partnership cooperation this could be obtained, however, that the commitment of addition funds and resources from the government is required in order to cause this to work. Internationally, the World Health Organization (2005) in its 56th Session held in New Caledonia stated that most child deaths could be avoided through the provision for more basic health care and detection, monitoring and follow up of pregnant mothers and newborns. The World Health Organization (2004) advises that to effectively reduce infant mortality, increased monitoring during the first month of life needs to be addressed as approximately 2/3rds of mortality occurs in the first month, with 2/3rd of that figure occurring in the first week. This holds implications for Northern Ireland in that an extended outreach, educational and monitoring program addressing the first month would effectively reduce infant mortality rates. Sweden, Norway and Demark provide an illustrat

Epic of Beowulf Essay - The Value System in Beowulf :: Epic Beowulf essays

The Value System Revealed in Beowulf  Ã‚   Beowulf is a deeply serious commentary on human life with the main characters embodying a pronounced and coherent set of values. They are also the representatives of the outlined code for conduct and behaviour of those times. Honour, generosity and trust may seem to be the key words in the code. The protagonists reiterate in actions and words a belief in the importance of generosity of spirit and self awareness that make man a responsible member of the society. Beowulf secures the future of his thanes, in case of his death, not leaving them up to their own fate. He proves that in the warrior society, human relationships must be based on mutual respect and trust rather than subordination of one man to another. A warrior vowing loyalty to his lord becomes a voluntary companion more than his servant, taking pride defending him and fighting in battles. In return, he receives affectionate care and rich rewards - e.g. seen in Hrothgar’s attitude to Beowulf’s achievements. The relationship between the relatives is also a part of the outlined characteristics of conduct - if a person was killed, a relative was obliged to kill the slayer or execute the wergild (â€Å"manprice†), even if the killing was accidental. In fact, the money was less important than the actual carrying out of the kinsman’s duty. â€Å"It is better for a man to avenge his friend than to much mourn† – states Beowulf firmly, reiterating the weight attached to the moral responsibilities rather than attention drawn to the materialistic possessions. They were valued highly - the treasure gained in battles improved the well being but it was more of a common factor spiritually uniting the warriors and allowing them to fully realise their potentials. Still, family was the priority. King Hrethel (‘grandfather’ of Beowulf), however, may exemplify a clash in following the code and set values. One of his sons accidentally killed another; by code of kinship king Hrethel was forbidden to exact compensation from a kinsman, yet by the same code he was required to do one in order to avenge death. He was trapped in a situation without a moral way out and therefore Hrethel refused to face life any longer. Marriage also appears to be a part of the general code. It was a form of alliance between the fighting tribes e.

Part One Friday

Barry Fairbrother's body had been moved to the undertaker's. The deep black cuts in the white scalp, like the grooves of skates on ice, were hidden by his forest of thick hair. Cold, waxen and empty, the body lay, re-dressed in Barry's anniversary dinner shirt and trousers, in a dimly lit viewing room where soft music played. Touches of discreet make-up had returned a life-like glow to his skin. It was almost as though he slept; but not quite. Barry's two brothers, his widow and his four children went to bid the body goodbye on the eve of the burial. Mary had been undecided, almost until the minute of departure, as to whether she should allow all of the children to see their father's remains. Declan was a sensitive boy, prone to nightmares. It was while she was still in a fever pitch of indecision on Friday afternoon that there was an upset. Colin ‘Cubby' Wall had decided that he wanted to go and say goodbye to Barry's body too. Mary, usually compliant and agreeable, had found this excessive. Her voice had grown shrill on the telephone to Tessa; then she had begun to cry again, and said that it was just that she had not planned a large procession past Barry, that this was really a family affair †¦ Dreadfully apologetic, Tessa said that she quite understood, and was then left to explain to Colin, who retreated into a mortified, wounded silence. He had simply wanted to stand alone beside Barry's body and pay silent homage to a man who had occupied a unique place in his life. Colin had poured truths and secrets he had confided to no other friend into Barry's ears, and Barry's small brown eyes, robin bright, had never ceased to regard him with warmth and kindness. Barry had been Colin's closest ever friend, giving him an experience of male comradeship he had never known before moving to Pagford, and was sure he would never have again. That he, Colin, who felt himself to be perpetually the outsider and the oddball, for whom life was a matter of daily struggle, had managed to forge a friendship with the cheerful, popular and eternally optimistic Barry, had always seemed a small miracle. Colin clutched what was left of his dignity to him, resolved never to hold this against Mary, and spent the rest of the day meditating on how surprised and hurt Barry would have been, surely, at his widow's attitude. Three miles outside Pagford, in an attractive cottage called the Smithy, Gavin Hughes was trying to fight off an intensifying gloom. Mary had called earlier. In a voice that trembled with the weight of tears, she had explained how the children had all contributed ideas for tomorrow's funeral service. Siobhan had grown a sunflower from seed, and was going to cut it and put it on top of the coffin. All four kids had written letters to put inside the casket with their father. Mary had composed one too, and was going to put it in Barry's shirt pocket, over his heart. Gavin put down the receiver, sickened. He did not want to know about the children's letters, nor about the long-nurtured sunflower, yet his mind kept returning to these things as he ate lasagne alone at his kitchen table. Though he would have done anything to avoid reading it, he kept trying to imagine what Mary had written in her letter. A black suit was hanging in dry-cleaner's polythene in his bedroom, like an unwelcome guest. His appreciation of the honour Mary had done him, in publicly acknowledging him as one of those closest to the popular Barry, had long since been overwhelmed by dread. By the time he was washing up his plate and cutlery at the sink, Gavin would have gladly missed the funeral altogether. As for the idea of viewing his dead friend's body, it had not, and would never have occurred to him. He and Kay had had a nasty row the previous evening, and had not spoken since. It had all been triggered by Kay asking Gavin if he would like her to go with him to the funeral. ‘Christ, no,' Gavin had said, before he could stop himself. He had seen her expression, and knew instantly that she had heard. Christ, no, people will think we're a couple. Christ, no, why would I want you? And although these were precisely his feelings, he had attempted to bluff his way through. ‘I mean, you didn't know him, did you? It'd be a bit weird, wouldn't it?' But Kay had let rip; tried to corner him, to make him tell her what he really felt, what he wanted, what future he envisioned for the two of them. He had fought back with every weapon in his arsenal, being alternately obtuse, evasive and pedantic, for it was wonderful how you could obscure an emotional issue by appearing to seek precision. At last she had told him to get out of her house; he had obeyed, but he knew that it was not over. That would be way too much to hope for. Gavin's reflection in the kitchen window was drawn and miserable; Barry's stolen future seemed to hang over his own life like a looming cliff; he felt inadequate and guilty, but he still wished that Kay would move back to London. Night drew in over Pagford, and in the Old Vicarage Parminder Jawanda perused her wardrobe, wondering what to wear to say goodbye to Barry. She had several dark dresses and suits, any one of which would be appropriate, and yet still she looked backwards and forwards along the rail of clothes, mired in indecision. Wear a sari. It'll upset Shirley Mollison. Go on, wear a sari. It was so stupid to think that – mad and wrong – and even worse to think it in Barry's voice. Barry was dead; she had endured nearly five days of deep grief for him, and tomorrow they would bury him in the earth. The prospect was unpleasant to Parminder. She had always hated the idea of interment, of a body lying whole under the ground, slowly rotting away, riddled with maggots and flies. The Sikh way was to cremate and to scatter the ashes in running water. She let her eyes wander up and down the hanging garments, but her saris, worn to family weddings and get-togethers back in Birmingham, seemed to call to her. What was this strange urge to don one? It felt uncharacteristically exhibitionist. She reached out to touch the folds of her favourite, dark blue and gold. She had last worn it to the Fairbrothers' New Year's party, when Barry had attempted to teach her to jive. It had been a most unsuccessful experiment, mainly because he did not know what he was doing himself; but she could remember laughing as she almost never laughed, uncontrollably, madly, the way she had seen drunk women laugh. The sari was elegant and feminine, forgiving of middle-aged spread: Parminder's mother, who was eighty-two, wore it daily. Parminder herself had no need of its camouflaging properties: she was as slim as she had been at twenty. Yet she pulled out the long, dark length of soft material and held it up against her dressing gown, letting it fall to caress her bare feet, looking down its length at its subtle embroidery. To wear it would feel like a private joke between herself and Barry, like the cow-faced house and all the funny things Barry had said about Howard, as they walked away from interminable, ill-humoured council meetings. There was a terrible weight on Parminder's chest, but did not the Guru Granth Sahib exhort friends and relatives of the dead not to show grief, but to celebrate their loved one's reunion with God? In an effort to keep traitorous tears at bay, Parminder silently intoned the night-time prayer, the kirtan sohila. My friend, I urge you that this is the opportune time to serve the saints. Earn divine profit in this world and live in peace and comfort in the next. Life is shortening day and night. O mind, meet the Guru and set right your affairs †¦ Lying on her bed in her dark room, Sukhvinder could hear what every member of her family was doing. There was the distant murmur of the television directly below her, punctuated by the muffled laughter of her brother and her father, who were watching a Friday-night comedy show. She could make out her elder sister's voice across the landing, talking on her mobile to one of her many friends. Nearest of all was her mother, clunking and scraping in the built-in wardrobe on the other side of the wall. Sukhvinder had drawn the curtains over her window and placed a draught excluder, shaped like a long sausage dog, along the bottom of her door. In the absence of a lock, the dog impeded the door's progress; it gave her warning. She was sure that nobody would come in, though. She was where she ought to be, doing what she ought to be doing. Or so they thought. She had just performed one of her dreadful daily rituals: the opening of her Facebook page, and the removal of another post from a sender she did not know. As often as she blocked the person bombarding her with these messages, they changed their profile and sent more. She never knew when one would appear. Today's had been a black and white image, a copy of a nineteenth-century circus poster. La Veritable Femme a Barbe, Miss Anne Jones Elliot. It showed the photograph of a woman in a lacy dress, with long dark hair and a luxuriant beard and moustache. She was convinced that it was Fats Wall who was sending them, although it might have been somebody else. Dane Tully and his friends, for instance, who made soft, grunting ape-like noises whenever she spoke in English. They would have done it to anybody of her colour; there were hardly any brown faces at Winterdown. It made her feel humiliated and stupid, especially as Mr Garry never told them off. He affected not to hear them, or else to hear only background chatter. Perhaps he, too, thought that Sukhvinder Kaur Jawanda was an ape, a hairy ape. Sukhvinder lay on her back on top of her covers and wished with all of her being that she was dead. If she could have achieved suicide, simply by willing it, she would have done it without hesitation. Death had come to Mr Fairbrother; why could it not happen to her? Better yet, why could they not swap places? Niamh and Siobhan could have their father back, and she, Sukhvinder, could simply slip into non-being: wiped out, wiped clean. Her self-disgust was like a nettle suit; every part of her prickled and burnt with it. She had to will herself, moment by moment, to endure, to remain stationary; not to rush to do the one and only thing that helped. The whole family had to be in bed before she acted. But it was agony to lie like this, listening to her own breathing, conscious of the useless weight of her own ugly and disgusting body on the bed. She liked to think of drowning, of sinking down into cool green water, and feeling herself slowly pressed into nothingness †¦ The great hermaphrodite sits quiet and still †¦ Shame ran down her body like a burning rash as she lay in the darkness. She had never heard the word before Fats Wall spoke it in maths on Wednesday. She would not have been able to look it up: she was dyslexic. But he had been kind enough to explain what it meant, so there was no need. The hairy man-woman †¦ He was worse than Dane Tully, whose taunts had no variety. Fats Wall's evil tongue fashioned a fresh, tailor-made torture every time he saw her, and she could not shut her ears. His every insult and jibe was branded on Sukhvinder's memory, sticking there as no useful fact had ever done. If she could have been examined on the things he had called her, she would have achieved the first A grade of her life. Tash ‘N' Tits. Hermaphrodite. The Bearded Dumb-bell. Hairy, heavy and stupid. Plain and clumsy. Lazy, according to her mother, whose criticism and exasperation rained down upon her daily. A bit slow, according to her father, who said it with an affection that did not mitigate his lack of interest. He could afford to be nice about her bad grades. He had Jaswant and Rajpal, both top of every class they took. ‘Poor old Jolly,' Vikram would say carelessly, after glancing through her report. But her father's indifference was preferable to her mother's anger. Parminder did not seem able to comprehend or accept that she had produced a child who was not gifted. If any of the subject teachers made the slightest hint that Sukhvinder might try harder, Parminder seized upon it in triumph. ‘†Sukhvinder is easily discouraged and needs to have more faith in her abilities.† There! You see? Your teacher is saying you don't try hard enough, Sukhvinder.' Of the only class in which Sukhvinder had reached the second set, computing – Fats Wall was not there, so she sometimes dared put up her hand to answer questions – Parminder said dismissively, ‘The amount of time you children spend on the internet, I'm surprised you're not in set one.' Never would it have occurred to Sukhvinder to tell either of her parents about the ape grunts or about Stuart Wall's endless stream of malice. It would mean confessing that people beyond the family also saw her as sub-standard and worthless. In any case, Parminder was friends with Stuart Wall's mother. Sukhvinder sometimes wondered why Stuart Wall did not worry about their mothers' connection, but concluded that he knew that she would not give him away. He saw through her. He saw her cowardice, as he knew her every worst thought about herself, and was able to articulate it for the amusement of Andrew Price. She had fancied Andrew Price once, before she realized that she was utterly unfit to fancy anyone; before she realized that she was laughable and strange. Sukhvinder heard her father's voice and Rajpal's, growing louder as they came up the stairs. Rajpal's laughter reached a crescendo right outside her door. ‘It's late,' she heard her mother call from her bedroom. ‘Vikram, he should be in bed.' Vikram's voice came through Sukhvinder's door, close by, loud and warm. ‘Are you asleep already, Jolly?' It was her childhood nickname, bestowed in irony. Jaswant had been Jazzy, and Sukhvinder, a grizzling, unhappy baby, rarely smiling, had become Jolly. ‘No,' Sukhvinder called back. ‘I've only just gone to bed.' ‘Well, it might interest you to know that your brother, here – ‘ But what Rajpal had done was lost in his shouting protests, his laughter; she heard Vikram moving away, still teasing Rajpal. Sukhvinder waited for the house to fall silent. She clung to the prospect of her only consolation, as she would have hugged a life-belt, waiting, waiting, for them all to go to bed †¦ (And as she waited, she remembered that evening not long ago, at the end of rowing training, when they had been walking through the darkness towards the car park by the canal. You were so tired after rowing. Your arms and your stomach muscles ached, but it was a good clean pain. She always slept properly after rowing. And then Krystal, bringing up the rear of the group with Sukhvinder, had called her a silly Paki bitch. It had come out of nowhere. They had all been messing around with Mr Fairbrother. Krystal thought she was being funny. She used ‘fucking' interchangeably with ‘very', and seemed to see no difference between them. Now she said ‘Paki' as she would have said ‘dozy' or ‘dim'. Sukhvinder was conscious of her face falling, and experienced the familiar sliding, scalding sensation in her stomach. ‘What did you say?' Mr Fairbrother had wheeled around to face Krystal. None of them had ever heard him properly angry before. ‘I di'n mean nuthin',' said Krystal, half taken aback, half defiant. ‘I was on'y jokin'. She knows I was jus' jokin'. Don' yeh?' she demanded of Sukhvinder, who muttered cravenly that she knew it was a joke. ‘I never want to hear you use that word again.' They all knew how much he liked Krystal. They all knew he had paid for her to go on a couple of their trips out of his own pocket. Nobody laughed louder than Mr Fairbrother at Krystal's jokes; she could be very funny. They walked on, and everybody was embarrassed. Sukhvinder was afraid to look at Krystal; she felt guilty, as she always did. They were approaching the people-carrier when Krystal said, so quietly that even Mr Fairbrother did not hear it: ‘I wuz jokin'.' And Sukhvinder said quickly, ‘I know.' ‘Yeah, well. S'ry.' It came out as a mangled monosyllable, and Sukhvinder thought it tactful not to acknowledge it. Nevertheless, it cleaned her out. It restored her dignity. On the way back to Pagford, she initiated, for the first time ever, the singing of the team's lucky song, asking Krystal to start with Jay-Z's rap.) Slowly, very slowly, her family seemed to be putting themselves to bed at last. Jaswant spent a long time in the bathroom, clinking and crashing around. Sukhvinder waited until Jaz had finished primping herself, until her parents had stopped talking in their room, for the house to fall silent. Then, at last, it was safe. She sat up and pulled the razor blade out from a hole in the ear of her old cuddly rabbit. She had stolen the blade from Vikram's store in the bathroom cabinet. She got off the bed and groped for the torch on her shelf, and a handful of tissues, then moved into the furthest part of her room, into the little round turret in the corner. Here, she knew, the torch's light would be confined, and would not show around the edges of the door. She sat down with her back against the wall, pushed up the sleeve of her nightshirt and examined by torchlight the marks left by her last session, still visible, criss-crossed and dark on her arm, but healing. With a slight shiver of fear that was a blessed relief in its narrow, immediate focus, she placed the blade halfway up her forearm and sliced into her own flesh. Sharp, hot pain and the blood came at once; when she had cut herself right up to her elbow she pressed the wad of tissues onto the long wound, making sure nothing leaked onto her nightshirt or the carpet. After a minute or two, she cut again, horizontally, across the first incision, making a ladder, pausing to press and to mop as she went. The blade drew the pain away from her screaming thoughts and transmuted it into animal burning of nerves and skin: relief and release in every cut. At last she wiped the blade clean and surveyed the mess she had made; the wounds intersecting, bleeding, hurting so much that tears were rolling down her face. She might sleep if the pain did not keep her awake; but she must wait for ten or twenty minutes, until the fresh cuts had clotted over. She sat with her knees drawn up, closed her wet eyes, and leaned against the wall beneath the window. Some of her self-hatred had oozed out with the blood. Her mind drifted away to Gaia Bawden, the new girl, who had taken such an unaccountable fancy to her. Gaia could have hung out with anyone, with her looks and that London accent, yet she kept seeking out Sukhvinder at lunchtimes and on the bus. Sukhvinder did not understand it. She almost wanted to ask Gaia what she thought she was playing at; day by day she expected the new girl to realize that she, Sukhvinder, was hairy and ape-like, slow and stupid, someone to be despised and grunted at and insulted. No doubt she would recognize her mistake soon, and Sukhvinder would be left, as usual, to the bored pity of her oldest friends, the Fairbrother twins.

Ntt Docomo

NTT DoCoMo i-mode:value innovation at DoCoMo. (2003). Recuperado de la base de datos de UESAN (031397) 16088 INSEADBlue Ocean Strategy lnstitute The Business School for the World18 BOS005 NTT DoCoMo i-mode TM: Value lnnovation at DoCoMo 08/2009-5079 This is a modified version of the original case ‘NTI' DoCoMo i-mode'l'M: Creating a Solution for the Masses' (number 05/2002-5036), written by Yasushi Shiina, INSEAD MBA 2000. Jason Hunter preparad this freely adapted version, under the supervision of Professors W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne and Ben M. Bensaou.It is intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrativa situation. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC i-modeTM is a registered trademark of NT1†² DoCoMo, Inc. in Japan. TO ORDER COPIES OF INSEAD CASES, 5EE DETA! Ul ON ‘! ‘HE BACK COVER. COPIES MAY NOT BE MADE WITHOUT PERMISSION. Every ten years, Japanese companies come up with a new mobile device that shakes the world. Sony's Walkman was launched in 1979 and Nintendo launched Gameboy in 1989. And in 1999, we invented i-mode.I Mari Matsunaga Kouji Ohboshi is a worried man. It's early 1999, and NTT DoCoMo's Chairman is anxiously waiting to hear how the press conference for i-mode- bis company's new mobile Internet system – has fared. He has every reason to be nervous. Although DoCoMo is a leader in the Japanese mobile industry, the market is showing signs of saturation and Ohboshi has gambled a large stake of bis company's future on the development of the new system. The report arrives and bis worst fears are realized: the press conference was a debacle.The launch of i-mode couldn't have gone worse. With only seven reporters attending, i ­ mode's extravagant debut had fallen on deaf ears. Those journalists present were among Japan's least charitable. With the Internet boom waning, reporters were more skeptical than ever. Mobile Internet services ha d failed elsewhere so why should they work in Japan? Why not wait, like everyone else, for the third generation (30) global wireless Internet protocol? Ohboshi knew that unfavorable or- worse – weak press coverage in Japan's trend-driven mobile phone market could spell disaster.Had he made the wrong decision to shift the company's strategic focus? Were bis skeptical colleagues at DoCoMo right? What Ohboshi didn't know at the time was that in the weeks to come, i-mode would become an explosive success. Like the Walkman and Gameboy that preceded it, i-mode was to be more than simply a commercial success – it became a phenomenon. What explains this amazing success in Japan? How did DoCoMo turn a highly competitive industry with declining growth potential into an attractive business opportunity? NTT DoCoMo's Trouhled BirthNTT DoCoMo was formed in 1992 as part of a partial govemment break-up of the powerful Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) telecom monopoly. Formerly NTT 's mobile phone unit, it was cast from the nest to take over wireless communications sales and operations as an independent enterprise. Kouji Ohboshi, an energetic 60-year-old, was the first CEO of a company whose name DoCoMo is both a play on the Japanese word for â€Å"anywhere† and an abbreviation of ‘Do Communications over the Mobile network. ‘ Interview: Ms. Mari Matsunaga, formerly Manager, Gateway Business Dept. NTT DoCoMo (20 Aug. 2001). Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 08/2009-5079 Blue Ocean Strategy Institute From the start, Ohboshi realized that DoCoMo had a tough road ahead. The mobile phone market was over-regulated, transmission quality was poor, subscription fees were costly and mobiles were heavy. 2 Moreover, there was a palpable sense that the market had reached a plateau (Exhibit 1). 3 Japan's economic bubble had burst and businesses had cut back mobile phone purchases.To add insult to injury, tough new govemment rules forbade the fledgling DoCoMo to ask NTT for financial assistance. By the end of its frrst year DoCoMo was saddled with a â€Å"1O billion yen loss †¦ and bankruptcy was a serious threat. â€Å"4 Paced with a looming crisis, Ohboshi went for broke, setting out to expand the market by bringing cellular phones to the masses. And he did so with a vengeance. During the next two years, Ohboshi invested 50 billion – a large sum for a company making a loss – to bring DoCoMo's mobile network services to everyday users. 5 His first move was to improve DoCoMo's network.In 1993 the company 1aunched its new revo1utionary PDC (Personal Digital Cellular) standard, bringing crystal clear calls, fewer interruptions and less background noise. Moreover, PDC helped DoCoMo use its limited allocation of radio spectrum more efficiently. Within a few months DoCoMo's PDC standard was adopted by competitor carriers across Japan. By December 1998, it would account for 98. 7% of the Japanese market. (Exhibit 4)6 Next DoCoMo slashed prices. lts high deposit was abolished in October 1993 and subscription fees were cut in 1996.By March 1999 monthly basic charges had dropped 73%, the average charge for a three-minute call on DoCoMo falling 57. 6% in the same period. Once again, the rest ofthe industry quickly followed suit by cutting fees (Exhibit 3). The lust for market share in the mid-90s drove carriers to continue slashing prices to rock bottom levels, even as monthly average revenue per user (ARPU) continued to sink (while monthly average minutes use remained relatively stable). (Exhibit 5) Ohboshi also attracted new customers by reducing the size of the phones.NTT had one of the largest R;D teams in the telecom industry and DoCoMo maintained close relationships with 2 Matsunaga (2000}, i-mode jiken (i-mode: The Birth of i-mode), Kadokawa Shoten. 3The frrst Japanese cellular phone service was launched in December 1979. It was a disaster. The high service fees made the telephones unaffordable t o all but the wealthiest of businessmen (sa/arimen). After putting down 200,000 deposit and a 72,000 subscription fee, users would hand over another 26,000 in monthly fees anda call charge of 280 for every three minutes.Moreover, the service area was limited, the sound quality was inferior to pay phones, and you had to be physically fit: first generation cellular phones weighed 3kg and were carried over the shoulder. With the stimulation of government deregulation and subsequent technological innovations it took a full 1O years before cell phones became increasingly attractive to mass consumers. Carriers and telecom equipment manufacturers worked closely to improve both the usability of the phones and the quality of transrnission. Rightly, they believed that reducing the size of handsets and extending their battery life were crucial improvements.By the end of 1998, the weight and the battery life of a standard phone reached 68g and 330 hours respectively (Exhibits 2 and 3). 4 Interv iew: Mr. Kouji Ohboshi, Chairman, NTT DoCoMo 5 Ohboshi (2000): DoCoMo kyuseicho no keiei (DoCoMo: Management ofrapid growth), Diamond Sha 6 Tadashi Aoyagi (2000): Daisansedai keitai business: nichibeiou no nerai (The third generation cellular phone business: Aims of Japan, US and Europe}, Ric Telecom (exhibit 19) Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 2 08/2009-5079 elecom equipment manufacturers. 7 Ohboshi leaned heavily on DoCoMo's engineers and its suppliers to reduce the size of phones and extend their battery life. Although DoCoMo was feeling the effects of deregulation, it made the best of the gains offered by the new competitive environment. Within ayear of Ohboshi's drastic measures, DoCoMo was still Japan's largest mobile telephone carrier, and its revenues and net income had soared. 8 By March 1999, DoCoMo's sales revenue ballooned to ;v;3,118 billion with a net income of;v;205 billion, and market capitalization topping out at ;v;11. trillion- about 60% of the size ofits parent co mpany, NTT. (Exhibit 8) The Wud, Wb'eless East NTT DoCoMo's emergence, together with deregulation, technological innovation, price reduction and the launch of new services all contributed to the rapid expansion of the mobile phone market to mass users in Japan. In a 10-month period during 1998, the market grew by an estimated 8 million users, bringing the total number of subscribers to 39. 8 million in January 1999- fulfilling 87. 2% of Japan's total wireless market. (Exhibit 1)9 Competition for market share in the late 1990s was cut-throat.Deregulation continued apace and by 1998 a flood of large foreign carriers and equipment manufacturers had entered the fast-growing market as the government lifted the last remaining limitations on foreign investment (Exhibit 4). 10 Competition was equally fierce in the drive to offer new services. J ­ Phone shrewdly targeted younger users, launching the first SMS (short message service) and information services via the J-Sky Web package. Using a similar approach, DoCoMo introduced the wildly successful ‘Pocket Board,' a well-designed yet inexpensive mobile with email and game functions. 1 By January 1999, the wireless market in Japan had experienced seven years of rapid expansion (Exhibit 1), with every third person owning a mobile phone. Although the size of the market was still small compared to that of fixed lines, its annua1 average growth rate of 7 DoCoMo inherited from NTI c1ose re1ationships with four 1arge Japanese suppliers (NEC, Fujitsu, Matsushita Communications Panasonic and Mitsubishi Electronics), who worked closely with NTI DoCoMo to break through technological barriers.This network soon became known as the ‘DoCoMo Family', since its products were sold under the NIT DoCoMo brand, and the only way to identify the manufacturer of a cellular phone was to look at the first letter of the product number (e. g. , ‘N' for NEC). These relationships gave NTI DoCoMo considerable advantage especially once its PDC standard was accepted as the only one in Japan. 8 It rernained the nation's leading carrier; however, at times DoCoMo's market share dropped below 50% due to fierce competition. The growth in subscribers was attributed to the increase in personal users. However, churn rates (subscriber termination rates) were also increasing, showing that customer loyalty was vulnerable in the new environment. 10 Airtouch acquired a 10-15% stake in the J-Phone Group of companies and offered its technical expertise; Motorola, a US electronic products manufacturer invested in the Tuka Group of companies. 11 For their part, DDI Cellular and IDO improved the quality of transmission substantially by adopting the US-based cdmaOne digital protocol.Although these services attracted new customers, these numbers were not significant enough to boost growth or change the structure of the market. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 3 08/2009-5079 —–y- Blue Ocean Strategy Institute 68% was a stounding compared to the anemic growth (1. 5%) of the ftxed line market. Yet despite general optimism in the market, Ohboshi was once again getting nervous. .A. fter Victory, Tighten your Helmet StrapHis marketing background had taught him that, â€Å"fast growth means fast maturity, and faster speed for the market to move from maturity to saturation and then to decline†. 12 The market was once again moving to saturation both in the number of potential new users and in capacity as available radio bandwidth increasingly limited market expansion. lt was time for action. To survive, Ohboshi believed that DoCoMo needed â€Å"to create a new market, not by adapting to changes but by creating the changes through positively transforming their corporate strategy†. 3 Ohboshi told his employees that DoCoMo had to shift from simply increasing the size of the voice-based wireless market, to creating new value for customers. Shortly afterwards, in July 1996, the company formerly a nnounced its new strategic focus: ‘from volume to value. ‘ Volume to Value At the heart of Ohboshi's â€Å"Volume to Value† focus was non-voice-based wireless data transmission. With the explosion of Internet use during the late 1990s (Exhibit 6), DoCoMo realized that the use of e-mail and the web was quickly becoming a cornerstone of everyday life.From new market and social psychology research, Ohboshi was convinced that, â€Å"the daily needs and wants of the people in a mature society like Japan would shift from physical goods to communication, information, knowledge and entertainment†. 14 Not only did the Internet offer new opportunities for ftlling customer demand, it also solved one of Ohboshi's greatest concerns: an increasingly congested radio spectrum. In contrast to traditional voice conversations that are sent via dedicated spectrum airwaves, Internet traffic is dispersed in small packets across the network to be eassembled at their destination ( e. g. , a user's telephone). IfDoCoMo created an alternative mobile Internet network based on packet ­ switching technologies, it would completely circumvent the burdened voice network. Within a year, DoCoMo was building one of Japan's ftrst nationwide packet-switching networks. 15 The mobile computing team was strengthened and soon new products and 12 Ohboshi (2000) 13 lbid. 14 Interview: Mr. Kouji Ohboshi, Chairman, NTT DoCoMo 15 This system wou1d not on1y ease the use of congested radio spectrum capacity, but a1so serve as the basis for 3G services.Despite the optimistic market expectation and technological developments, the prospects for the 3G technologies were not necessarily bright. Although similar new data communication services attracted customers (e. g. , WAP services in Europe), they had not proved to be adequate enough to boost the market, and it was feared that the same might be true of 3G cellular services. The introduction of new 3G technologies would also create h uge additional costs for carriers, which had already incurred more than l trillion yen capital expenditure over the past few years (Exhibit 7).Furthermore, competition would increase as other intemational carriers competed in a single global market. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 4 08/2009-5079 services were introduced- albeit not very successfully- culminating in 1997 with the  · 10 e ­ mail service' (customers could send and receive 2 kilobytes of data for a mere 10). 16 Although these early Internet initiatives were not big profit-makers for NTT DoCoMo, they created a new market by attracting customers who had never used cellular phones or e-mail before.As one of the team members involved in developing mobile computing services pointed out, â€Å"Our intention was not to develop and introduce new products into the market, but to create and introduce new ways ofusing our traditional wireless services. â€Å"17 The New Wireless World In January 1997, Ohboshi asked Keiichi Eno ki, a former electrical engineer and DoCoMo's new Director of Corporate Sales, to plan and launch a new mobile data communication service for the mass market embodying his †volume to value† strategy. 8 He later reflected: About ayear after we started launching new mobile data communication services, revenues from such new services increased to constitute 5o/'o-6% of our total revenues. With detailed marketing research and advice from externa/ consultants, 1 felt a need to further boost these new services and asked Enoki, whom 1trusted, to head a project speciflcally targeting the mass market. 1 assured him that he would have full discretion in choosing his staff and in using funds worth 5 billion yen, which is a lot of money. 9 Enoki would have his work cut out for him. DoCoMo had a new strategic focus, but after two long years Ohboshi's team had yet to match vision with performance. Enoki had to create a winner. He was tasked to develop a mobile phone service that would advance the Internet in the same way the Sony Walkman had advanced the stereo. But how? â€Å"I got the first hints from my family,† recalls Enoki. â€Å"At that time, the pager was at the peak ofits popularity. My daughter used the number pad as a form of data communication.My son could play a new computer game without reading the instructions. Their ability to adapt to 16 In addition to these measures, Ohboshi and his successor Keiji Tachikawa, (then Vice-President}, set up a small project team within the Corporate Strategy Planning Department, and very soon the first proposal for NTT DoCoMo's ‘Vision 2010' was drafted. The year 2010 was deliberately chosen as ‘it will be the time when wireless telecom technologies will make nnovations from 30 to 40 and also the period of 10 years is the longest possible for reasonable predictions to be rnade in a fast-changing environment' ‘Vision 2010' forecast huge opportunities for mobile telecom services in enrichin g personal lives and in supporting global corporate activities. In particular, it saw a greater role for mobile data services in fulfilling the needs of women, senior citizens and medica! systems, important to a society characterized by a lower birth rate and an aging population.In addition to these market projections, it also emphasized the need for DoCoMo to cooperate with other companies to expand the wireless telecom market, and summarized DoCoMo's operations towards the year 2010 in five key concepts or ‘MAGIC' for short (Exhibit 9). 17 Interview: Mr. lrukayama, Mobile Multimedia Business Department, NTT DoCoMo. 18 Ohboshi (2000). 19 Interview: Mr. Kouji Ohboshi, Chairman, NTT DoCoMo. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 5 08/2009-5079 ew information technology and its ease of use convinced me that young people would accept a new data service that would give them the same kind of enjoyment. â€Å"20 Now a believer, Enoki set out to tackle the new initiative by doing the unthink able: recruiting new blood from the outside to lead the project. He first called Mari Matsunaga, a senior executive at Recruit Co. , a job placement fmn. Matsunaga was known for her marketing prowess and dramatic turnaround of Recruit's job placement magazine for women into one of Japan's hottest titles. She would head the content development team for DoCoMo's new service.Enoki then sought out a manager to devise a business model for the new mobile data communication service. He chose Takeshi Natsuno, a Wharton MBA and former head of Hypernet, one of Japan's frrst (and most hyped) net startups. 21 Developing the Electronic Concierge service Mastunaga set out to understand how the Internet works. What were the killer applications that provided web users with superior value? In studying the winners – such as AOL (America Online)- she found a positive correlation between the number oflnternet users and the volume of content. As content increased, so did the number of users and v ice versa. 2 Hence her conclusion: ‘Content would have to be king on the new DoCoMo system. ‘ She also recognized that simply putting ‘information' on the network would not differentiate the new service from the existing PC-based Internet, nor would it add value to users who were often lost in the sea of information on the web. Matsunaga thus envisioned a service that would function like a ‘hotel concierge', where users would be ‘serviced' by content providers. If DoCoMo could make it possible for users to access pre-selected websites on the screen of their handset, then they would capture Mastunaga's concept of an E/ectronic Concierge.The team set out to create such a user-friendly portal (Exhibit 10) to serve both asan accreditation of quality for those pre-selected â€Å"official† sites, as well as an easy way to navigate the whole wireless web – similar to the service AOL provides its customers (Exhibit 11). Users could access other â €Å"non-official† sites simply by typing in the URL address. Meanwhile, Natsuno devised a business model for the new mobile data communication service based on what he saw as the â€Å"Internet worldview† rather than the â€Å"telecom worldview†. 3 The telecom worldview, according to Natsuno, is a zero-sum approach: carriers determine the standards and the services that can ride on their network, and are not interested in adapting to others' technology or in sharing profits with other players in the value chain. Users must accept the infrastructure and services carriers offer them. Conversely, the â€Å"Internet worldview† is a positive-sum approach. As the Internet is an open network that can be accessed with various devices (e. g. , computers, PDAs) whose 0 ‘A discussion with Keiichi Enoki, Senior Vice President, General Manager of Gateway Business Department, Mobile Multimedia Division' in NTT DoCoMo Annua1 Report 2000. 21 By the time he joined D oCoMo, Natsuno had already left Hypemet before the free ISP fell from glory in a multi-billion yen crash in 1997. 22 Interview: Mr. Kazuhiro Takagi, Director, Gateway Business Department, NTT DoCoMo. 23 Takeshi Natsuno (2000), i-modeâ„ ¢ strategy (i-modeâ„ ¢ strategy), Nikkei BP. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 6 08/2009-5079 pecifications are not necessarily determined by either content providers or carriers – all parties are obliged to accept one another's technologies and services. In the Internet world, consumers choose the infrastructure they prefer. Specifications are thereby de jacto standards determined not by their technological superiority but by the fact that they are so frequently used. In the Internet worldview, Natsuno believed, carriers have to work closely with other players, including information providers, to increase the number ofusers.This ‘win-win' relationship arnong players within the network becarne the foundation of Natsuno's business model . Accordingly, DoCoMo would not purchase content from providers or equipment from manufacturers but would rather accredit â€Å"official† websites and mobile phones to be used with the new service. Interested partners would share both the risks and the rewards. Although this model restricted DoCoMo's role to simply that of a â€Å"gateway† to the Internet, as the service attracted more users, the idea went, the network would attract more content.More content would beget more users; more users would beget more content, and so on,24 thereby creating a virtuous circle where all parties benefit. Natsuno's ‘win-win' business model would also be applied to the new service's billing system. A number of the â€Å"official† sites would be subscription-only sites requiring customers to pay fees ranging from ;y;? oo to ;y;300 per month. Under Natsuno's plan, DoCoMo would collect all these fees as part ofits monthly phone bill, take a 9% commission, and then pass on t he rest to the content providers.This service would be attractive not only to content providers who could reduce their interna! cost structure, but also to users who would appreciate not having to pay several separate bills. And by giving content providers a means to charge users, i-mode would ensure that there was plenty of high quality content available. Lastly, Natsuno recommended that the new service adopt existing widely-used technologies. For exarnple, although there were better texts languages such as WML (Wireless Markup Language), DoCoMo adopted c-HTML for its new service.With this compact version of HTML, the language widely used to create websites for the PC environment, content providers could quickly, easily and at low cost modify their PC-based websites into a new version to be displayed on the new DoCoMo service. New handsets were also developed that closely resembled existing cellular phones used exclusively for voice communication. Manufacturers were asked to reduce the size and weight of the new handsets while increasing screen size, data capacity and battery power. The Launch of i-modeAlmost a year had passed since Ohboshi had taken the decision to develop the new mobile data communication service, and pressure was mounting on him to perform. Although NTT DoCoMo had managed to maintain its position as the largest mobile telecom carrier in Japan, the cost of developing the new data service was taking its toll on Ohboshi's credibility and threatening the financia! stability of the company. Colleagues peering in from outside Enoki's group were confounded by the project. â€Å"Why were we wasting our time and resources on unproven Internet phones, instead of concentrating on the still-growing, regular voice- 4Similarly, content providers were inspired to continuously update their sites in order to keep their official status. And as content providers improved their websites, users were able to receive more ‘useful' information from accessi ng the network and thus, al! three players on the network benefited. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 7 08/2009-5079 based communication services? † they wondered.By late 1998, opposition to ‘Volume to Value' was growing and Ohboshi was once again under frre. Enoki and his team finally launched the new service as ‘i-mode' on 22 February 1999- the ‘i' representing ‘interactive', ‘Internet' and the pronoun ‘I'. 25 Looking at the phones, a user would notice little difference from the latest models, except for a slightly larger liquid crystal display and the central feature: the i-mode button (Exhibit 12). This connected users to the Internet, where they could send and receive e-mail, access sport scores and weather, read the news, and download pages from the web.The new i-mode handsets were priced from ;v;35,900 to Y42,800, about 25% more than regular phones (see Exhibit 15 for comparison with other goods/services). Users were charged ;v;300 per month to access the i-mode network, and another ,y;? oo to ,y;300 to access any of the subscription-only sites. Unlike regular mobile services, users were charged by the volume of data transmitted to their mobile phones rather than the length of time on the network. For instance, it would cost ,y;Q. 3 per packet transmitted, and . 2 to send (,y;2. 1 to receive) an e ­ mail of up to 250 characters. Exhibit 13) Data transmission over mobile phones would become increasingly important for DoCoMo's bottom line: as revenue from voice calls continued to fall – from an average of $100/subscriber per month in 1997 to $65 in 2001 -data revenue amounting toan average of $17 per subscriber/month would increasingly fill the gap. 26 Initially 67 content providers participated in the new service, with sites ranging from banking to Karaoke. 27 In the days that followed, dozens of â€Å"unofficial† sites sprang up, even though they were excluded from DoCoMo's official portal.Aventure company developed a search engine for unofficial sites just 11 days after the launch of the new service as their number reached 190 (twice as many as i-mode official sites) within two months. (Exhibit 14)28 i-mode was aggressively promoted through DoCoMo's nationwide network of shops. A how ­ to book on i-mode was also published, followed by over 100 books and magazines within a year. 29 The number of subscribers exploded reaching Natsuno's â€Å"critica! mass† of 1 million users by August 1999 (Exhibit 16). 0 By March 2001, i-mode subscribers reached 21. 7 million (Exhibit 17), and revenues from packet transmission services increased from ,y;295 million to ;v;38. 5 billion within ayear after launch (Exhibit 18). 31 i-mode also contributed to an increase in revenue from regular voice services, even as price competition drove down 25 Natsuno (2000). 26 ‘Peering around the comer', The Economist, 11 October 2001. 27 ‘Mobile intemet saizensen (Frontiers of mobile i ntemet)' in Shukan Diamond, 18 March 2000. 28 Natsuno (2000). 29 lbid. 30 lbid. 1 According to one senior official at NTI DoCoMo, ‘i-mode surprisingly attracted not only young customers who were generally fond of new technologies, but also old customers who used it as a tool to communicate more often with their grandchildren. In March 2001, 27% ofthe total i-mode users were above the age of 40, compared to 20. 3% for PC-based Internet (Exhibit 21). Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 8 08/2009-5079 average monthly revenue per subscriber to V! ,770 in March 2001. 32 In addition, the important customer churn rate began to drop from 1. 97 in FY1998 to 1. 39 in FY2001, while DoCoMo's market share in the cellular market climbed to 59. 1% in March 200l. (Exhibits 5 and 18) Playing Catch-up Two months after i-mode's extraordinary launch, two competitors, DDI Cellular and IDO, announced their own mobile data communication services, called ‘EZ Web' and ‘EZ Access' respectively. Similar to i-mode, customers could subscribe to their services to access the Internet via their mobile phones. 3 However, with an eye towards future markets abroad, DDI and IDO asked their content providers to code their pages in HDML (Handheld Device Markup Language) used for the Wireless Access Protocol (WAP)34. Unsurprisingly, due to the costs and difficulties in transforming existing HTML-based Internet websites to EZ Web sites based on HDML, only a handful of content providers were willing to participate in the new service, driving DDI Cellular and IDO to purchase content until the number of subscribers was high enough for content providers to bear such costs voluntarily.In 2000, the two carriers merged to create ‘AU (access to you)'. Although the number of DDI and IDO subscribers was much smaller than DoCoMo's i-mode subscribers, they still remained competitive with 6. 7 million subscribers in 2001. (Exhibit 17) DoCoMo's other main rival, J-Phone responded to i-mode's su ccess by concentrating on improving transmission quality and adding content to its existing service (J-Sky Web), and upgrading its J-Sky service so that users could send and receive large e-mail messages (3,000 characters each) and view Internet content. 5 As with i-mode and EZ Web, all official J ­ Phone sites were accessible via the J-Phone portal and classified into nine categories. 36 By 32 This increase in revenue was due to the fact that ‘subscribers were using i-mode and voice-based communication services together, as they made phone calls after they searched restaurants and hotels on i ­ mode (‘lnterview: Keiji Tachikawa' in Shukan Diamond, 18 March 2000). 33 In addition to Internet access, the new EZ Web service offered subscribers e-mail services. They cou1d now send e-mails ofup to 250 characters and receive e-mails ofup to 2,000 characters on their cellu1ar phones.Furthermore, DDI Cellular and IDO offered PIM (Personal Information Management) services tha t were not offered by their competitors. By paying a 100 premium for address, schedule and task list functions, EZ Web subscribers were able to use their cellular phones more like PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants). DDI Cellu1ar and IDO initially offered these new EZ Web services by using circuit 1ine switching technology that was also used for their voice-based telecom services. None of them had yet a packet ­ switching network.Thus, unlike i-mode, they charged EZ Web subscribers for the connecting time rather than for the volume of data transrnitted to cellular phones (Exhibit 19). 34 DDI and IDO also asked a number oftheir content providers to connect directly to DDI Cellular and IDO's EZ Web servers, in order to secure confidentia1ity and stable transrnissions. 35 The amount of viewable content was also increased by allowing access not only to its own ‘official sites,' but also to HTML-based Internet sites and even to c-HTML-based i-mode sites by introducing MML (Mobile Markup Language) as the 1anguage for content.MML was another simplified version of HTML developed for simple mobile computing devices by J-Phone and Keio University in Tokyo. Although it was not accepted intemationally like c-HTML or HDML, it was very similar to HTML and made it easy for content providers to adapt their existing Internet websites, or even their i-mode sites, into MML-based J ­ Sky websites. 36 In a strategy to attract younger customers, J-Phone's content focuses on entertainment. ‘Keitai Denwa, PHS Kanzen Test (Cellular phones, PHS: Perfect test)', Nikkei Trendy, September 2000.Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 9 08/2009-5079 INSEAD Blue Ocean Strategy Institute 2001, the new J-Sky service continued to attract many new – particularly adolescent – customers, totaling 6. 2 million subscribers in March 2001. {Exhibit 17) Without a Net As its competitors played catch-up, DoCoMo continued to power ahead in its quest for i ­ mode dominance in Japan. I n March 1999, a month after the launch of i-mode, it formed a strategic alliance with Sun Microsystems.Through the partnership, Sun and DoCoMo developed i-appli, a new i-mode application platform that allowed users to run a wider variety of programs, from video games to online fmancial services on their mobile phones. 37 A similar strategic partnership with Symbian, a UK-based wireless operating system company, led to the development of a new operating system adaptable to both PCs and mobile phones. On the content side, in the two years after launching i-mode, DoCoMo struck a number of partnerships with new content providers, ranging from Japan Net Bank (the frrst Internet bank in Japan) and Playstation. om, to AOL and Walt Disney. Furthermore, i-mode pioneered so ­ called machine-to-machine or M2M communications that allow i-mode users to purchase soft drinks and other sundries from Japan's huge network of vending machines. A joint venture with Dentsu, the largest advertising age ncy in Japan, led to the introduction of advertisements on i-mode, thereby providing a new source of revenue and attracting new content providers to the network. Through these and other partnerships the i-mode network swelled to 42,720 sites (1,620 official and 41,100 unofficial) by March 2001.Looking into the near future, DoCoMo had great hopes for entering the European and American markets and establishing i-mode as a global standard. In recent years, the Japanese mobile giant had been building its equity stakes in various foreign carriers (Exhibit 20), as well as applying for 3G licenses in markets inside and outside of Japan. In January 2001, while NTT DoCoMo was announcing plans to introduce i-mode in Europe38 a number of crucial questions needed answers. Were i-mode and its success easily transferable outside of Japan? Could DoCoMo make it work outside of Japan and should it use the same strategy?Despite i-mode's runaway success, DoCoMo faced a number ofkey domestic challenges . Its capital expenditures continued to soar as it built its new 3G services. Network congestion and interoperability between newer mobiles and the i-mode system continued to plague the company. In March 2001, under intense political pressure, DoCoMo was forced to reduce interconnection fees to other mobile phone operators. And with Vodafone's acquisition of a controlling stake in J-Phone, DoCoMo's guaranteed preeminence in the Japanese market carne under an increasingly dark cloud.How sustainable was NTT DoCoMo's advantage and what should its future moves be? Keiji Tachikawa, Ohboshi's successor, believed that NTT DoCoMo's future was bright. In the three years since the launch of i-mode, DoCoMo had become the only company to make money out of the mobile Internet. Its net income continued to rise to an all-time high of :Y:365. 5 billion in March 2001, and its market capitalization far exceeded its parent company, 37i-appli is based on Sun's popular, highly compatible Java prograrnmi ng language. Java allows application sharing across operating systems (e. . , between Microsoft Windows and Macintosh). 38 These initiatives are in partnership with KPN Mobile and Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM). Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 10 08/2009-5079 NTT. In the fall of 2001, DoCoMo launched FOMA (â€Å"freedom of multimedia access†), the world's first 3G mobile network capable of video-telephony and the use of data and voice services simultaneously) while other promised 3G initiatives around the world languished.As Tachikawa said, â€Å"Anything mobile in society is a business opportunity for NTT DoCoMo†. 39 Maybe Mr. Ohboshi can finally get a good night's sleep. 39 ‘Interview: Keiji Tachikawa' in Shukan Diamond, 21 April2001. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 11 08/2009-5079 Exhihit 1 Number of Regular Mobile Phone/PHS Subscribers in ]apan (in million) Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar-Mar-Mar- Mar-Mar-Mar-Jan-99 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Mobile phones0. 49 0. 87 1. 38 1 . 172. 13 4. 33 10. 20 20. 88 31. 53 39. 9 PHS 1. 51 6. 03 6. 73 5. 86 Total 0. 49 0. 87 1. 38 1. 712. 134. 33 11. 71 26. 9138. 25 45. 64 (Reference) Pagers4. 25 5. 08 5. 916. 69 8. 06 9. 35 10. 6110. 07 7. 12 4. 27 Fixed-line-54. 48 56. 2157. 60 58. 7859. 8861. 04 61. 46 60. 38 NIA Source: Ministry ofPublic Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications (MPHPT), Telecommunication Carriers Association (TCA), Statistics Bureau and Statistics Centre. Exhihit 2 Development of Regular Mobile Phones in ]apan Year Height Width Thickness Weight Battery Life 1979| 140| 50| 210| 2,400| NIA| 1985| 190| 55| 220| 3,000| 8| 987| 120| 42| 180| 900| 6| 1989| 175| 42| 77| 640| 9| 1991| 140| 47| 26| 220| 13| 1994| 143| 49| 29| 185| 20| 1995| 140| 42| 26| 155| 150| 1996| 130| 41| 23| 94| 170| 1997| 127| 40| 18| 79| 220| 1979| 140| 50| 210| 2,400| NIA| 1985| 190| 55| 220| 3,000| 8| 1987| 120| 42| 180| 900| 6| 1989| 175| 42| 77| 640| 9| 1991| 140| 47| 26| 220| 13| 1994| 143| 49| 29| 185| 20| 199 5| 140| 42| 26| 155| 150| 1996| 130| 41| 23| 94| 170| 1997| 127| 40| 18| 79| 220| {mm} {mm} {mm} {g} (hours} 1998 123 39 17 68 330 Source:NTT DoCoMo, Panasonic. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC12 08/2009-5079 Mobile Phone Rates en 200,000 180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. .. †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. _ †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. -Deposit — Subscription fee – – – – – –  · Monthly basic charge (analogue) –Monthly basic charge (digital) r—â€Å"‘ ;;::-g, â€Å"‘ r—â€Å"‘ ;;::-g, â€Å"‘ o. _†¦.. O oN †¦. â€Å"Mo. Copyright © 2003lNSEAD-EAC Digital MOVA N503i HYPER (i-appli) (March 2001) Price: Open Weight: 98g Size: N/A Battery life: 460 hours -mode Packet Transmission Charges 18 Digital MOVA D503iS HYPER (i-appli) (September 2001) Price: Open Weight: 105g Size: N/A Battery life: 450 hours 08/2009-5079 Mymenu MenuList Mobile banking (balance information) Mobile banking (funds transfer) News Airline seat availability Restaurant guide TOWNPAGE (NTT telephone directory) Share prices (searching by issue code) Image download (downloading one still image the size ofthe display) i-melody (downloading one 3-chord melody approx. 15 seconds in length) Char es 2-3 3-4 20-21 59-60 17-18 24-25 37-38 35-36 26-27 7-8 2-3 -anime (downloading one moving image the size ofthe display) 10-11 i-mode mail transrnission charges| Sending| Receiving| 20 Full-size characters| 0. 9| 0. 9| 50 Full-size characters| 1. 5| 0. 9| 100 Full-size characters| 2. 1| 1. 2| 150 Full-size characters| 3. 0| 1. 5| 250 Full-size characters 4. 2 2. 1 Source:NTT DoCoMo. Exhihit 14 The Number of i-mode Compatible Sites 30000 c:::JNumber ofi-mode Wlofficial sites 60% 25 000 20000 15 000 10000 5 000 —+-% oftota l access 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% mars-99sept-99mars-00 Note: Number of sites in March 1999 is the number on 5 April 1999.Source: Natsuno (2000), p. 187. 0% sept-00 Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC19 08/2009-5079 —-.. –Blue Ocean Strategy Institute Exhihit 15 Retail Price per Unit and Market Size for Various Goods/Services (in FY 1999) ItemsAverage retail price (Yen) Weekly magazine300 Monthly magazine550-540 Newspapers (monthly)3,925-4,384 TV set97,130 Radio tape recorder19,680 Mobile computer games (Gameboy)8,900 Computer game software (Gameboy)3,000-4,900 Home PC207,000-227,000 Telephone (fixed-Jine)21,270 i-mode handsets35,900-42,800 Mobile phones (voice only)28,200-42,800 PHS handsets16,700-30,100Market size (thousands) 138,480 214,630 72,218 434,171 24,233 23,970 NIA 14,311 58,470 _R gJ 9_Q-_l ,? 9_Q _? ?_6_ . TV Jicense fees (month1y)1,345 Internet connection charges (month1y: fixed)8,050 2. 7 Yen per 1 min. Telephone bill (fixed line: monthly) Telephone bill (mobile: m onthly) Telephone bill (PHS: monthly) 8,198 10 Yen per 3 min. 9,270 45-120 yen per 3 min. 5,550 30-130 Yen per 3 min. Pager bill (monthly) 2,697 Note: – Telephone bilis are estimated from ARPU or Operating revenues. – Market size ofTV, Radio tape recorder and Home PC are estimated from their penetration rates. Market size of Gameboy is estimated from its outstanding units sold. Source: MPHPT, NTT DoCoMo, NTT, TCA, Dentsu Institute for Human Studies. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC20 08/2009-5079 i-mode Monthly Subscriber Trend 25,000 70% Number of i-mode 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 subscribers (thousands) % of total subscribers 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% oilDllilhUWWllil WWWUUhllllilUL0% 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 o o o o o o †¦.. 1 1 1 1 1  § 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  § 1 1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 13 †¦.. ()..!. () 13Source: NTT DoCoMo, TCA. ()Q) ()Q) †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. Exhihit 17 Number of Subscribers for Mobile Data Services on Cellular Phones t housands 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 –i-mode – — EZWeb –J-Sky 15,000 10,000 5,000 0+–+—4–+–+—4–4–+- 910, 910, 910, 910, 910, r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,'. r;::,'. r;::,'. r;::,'. r;::,'. #;#;#; Source: TCA. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC21 08/2009-5079 Blue Ocean Strategy lnstitute Exhihit 18 NTl' DoCoMo's Financia} Performance since the Launch ofi-mode million yen} Sales revenues| Mar-99| Mar-00| Mar-01| Mar-02E| | 3,118,398| 3,718,694| 4,686,004| 5,297,000| Revenues from packet data communication| 295| 38,500| NIA| NIA| Netincome| 204,815| 252,140| 365,505| 390,000| Operating margin| 16. 3%| 14. 7%| 16. 6%| 17. 4%| Net income margin| 6. 6%| 6. 8%| 7. 8%| 7. 4%| Market capitalization——————————————————————â €”———————–| 11,203,920| 40,314,960| 20,977,333| NIA———–| Capital expenditures| 845,900| 876,058| 1,012,795| 1,070,000| R&D Expenses| 41,100| 89,100| 95,400| NIA|Average monthly churn rate| 1. 75%| 1. 61%| 1. 39%| 1. 32%| Average month1y revenue per user (ARPU: yen)| 9,270| 8,740| 8,650| 8,580| ARPU from cellular phone service (yen)| NIA| 8,620| 7,770| 7,160| ARPU from i-mode (yen)| NIA| 120| 880| 1,420| Average monthly minutes ofuse per subscriber| 164| 177| 189| 195| Number of subscribers (thousands)| 23,897| 29,356| 36,026| 40,300| Number ofi-mode subscribers (thousands)| 140| 5,603| 21,695| 29,800| Market share| 57. 5%| 57. 4%| 59. 1%| NIA| Source:NTT DoCoMo. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC2208/2009-5079Mobile Data Communication Services on Mobile Phones (as of Sept. 2000) | NTT DoCoMo| DDI Cellular(au)| IDO (au)| Tu-Ka| J-Phone| Service| i-mode| EZWeb| EZAccess| EZWeb| J-Sky| Functions|  œ Internet access- Internet mail transmission| – Internet access- Internet mail transmission- PIM services| – Internet access- Internet mail transmission- PIM services| – Internet access- Internet mail transmission- PIM services| – Internet access(J-Sky Web)- Internet mail transmission (J- Sky Walker)| NetworkPlatforms| PDC (800MHz)| cdmaOne(800 MHz)| cdmaOne(800MHz)| PDC (1. GHz)| PDC (1. 5 GHz)| CommunicationMethod(Speed)| Packet switching technology (9600 bps)| Circuit switching technology (14. 4 kbps)| Circuit switching technology (14. 4 kbps)| Circuit switching technology (9600 bps)| Circuit switching technology (9600 bps)| | | Packet switching technology (14. 4 kbps)| Packet switching technology (14. kbps)| | | Content| c-HTML| HDML (WAPbased)| HDML (WAPbased)| HDML (WAP based)| MML| Content Providers| Official: 1,000Unofficial: 24,032| Official: 368Unofficial: 1,600| Official: 258Unofficial: 2,700| E-mail size| Sendlreceive: 250 full characters| Se nd: 250 full charactersReceive: 2,000 full characters| Sendlreceive:3,000 characters| Fee CollectionServices| February 1999| March2000| July 2000| June 2000| April2000| Monthly Basic Charge (yen)| 300| Standard: 300Premium: 400| Standard: 200Premium: 400| Standard: 200Premium: 300| J-Sky Web: No chargeJ-Sky Walker:250| AccessFees| 0. 3 yenper 1 packet (= 128 bytes)| First 15 seconds free and 1O yen per 30 seconds thereafter| 1O yen per minute| First minute 3 yen and 10 yen per minute thereafter| J-Sky Web: 2 yen per single request1 replyJ-Sky Walker: 8 yen per message transmission| | | Packet comm. :0. 27 yen per 1 packet (= 128 bytes)| Packet comm. :0. 7 yen per 1 packet (= 128 bytes)| | | Handset (Nominal 1 Real retail prices: yen)| NECN502i(39,0001 18,800)Mitsubishi D209i(34,600 1 16,800)| Panasonic C308P (44,300 1 1,800)Sony C305S (45,8001 1,800)| Sharp J-SH03 (42,000 1 9,800)Toshiba J-T04 (42,000 1 7,800)| Panasonic TPOl(Open 1 4,800)Toshiba TI02 (Open 1 4,800)| Subscribers {_% ofmarket)| 12. 6 million(64. 2%)| 3. 9 million(16. 5%)| 0. 7 million(3. 3%)| 3. 1 million(16. 0%)| Service start| February 1999| Aprill999| November 1999| December 1999| Source: NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, MSDW, CSFB, TC. A, ‘Nikkei Trendy'Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC23 08/2009-5079 Blue Ocean Strategy Institute Exhibit 20 NTI' DoCoMo's Major Overseas Operations since 1999 2 March 1999 Joint test of 30 mobile communications system with Telephone Organization of Thailand and NEC 17 March 1999 Establishment of local corporation in Brazil 30 September 1999 Establishment ofUS subsidiaries 8 October 1999 Establishment of Joint Initiative toward Mobile Multimedia (JIMM) with 8 forei calliers 2 December 1999 Capital investment in Hutchison Whampoa (Hong Kong) 27 January 2000 W-CDMA field trials in South Korea with SK Telecom May2000Equity participation in KPN Mobile (the Netherlands) 27 June 2000 Establishment ofrepresentative office in Bemng, China 12 July 2000 Announcement of 30 mobile mul timedia strategic cooperation with Hutchison Whampoa and KPN Mobile 2 August 2000 Launch of Japan-South Korea roaming service with SK Telecom 29 S tember 2000 Establishment ofUK subsidiary and research lab in Oermany 30 November 2000 Capital investment in KG Telecomj_Taiwall}_ 30 November 2000 Capital investment in AT;T Wireless (US) 7 December 2000 Establishment ofadvisory board in US 8 January 2001 Announcement ofPan-European mobile Internet alliance with KPN Mobile and TIM Jltalyl 22 January 2001 Launch ofinternational roaming service in Europe, Asia Africa and Oceania 7 Novernber 2001 Agreernent with KPN Mobile to transfer and license technologies for i-mode-like services in Europe 18 February 2002 Agreement with E-Plus (Oermany) to transfer and license technologies for i-mode- like services in Europe (service launched on 16 March 2002) 1 March2002Listing ofstocks on London and New York Stock ExchangesNote: The dates shown above are the dates ofPress Releases from NTT DoCoMo (as ofMarch 2002). Source:NTT DoCoMo. (Other major partnerships to promote mobile multimedia servtces) 15 March 1999| Increased leve! ofrelationshiPs, S! mbian (UK)| 16 March 1999| Technological partnership, Sun Microsystems (US)| 17 March 1999| Fusion oftechnologies, increased leve! ofcooperation, Microsoft (US)| 14 June 2000| Increased level of relationships, 3Com {US)| 27 September 2000| Joint development of new Internet services, American Online (US)|Note: The dates shown above are the dates ofPress Releases from NTT DoCoMo (as ofSept. 2000). Source:NTT DoCoMo. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC2408/2009-5079 Exhibit 21 Comparison between i-mode and the Internet | i-mode| Internet| Sex ofusers(Male: Female)| 57:43| 58:42| Age ofusers| Under 19:7%20-24:24%25-29:20%30-34: 12%35-39:8% Above 40: 27% Unknown:2%| Under 19: 2. 6%20-29:38. 1%30-39:38. 1%40-49: 15. 6% Above 50:4. 7% Unknown: 0. 9%| Price| Monthly basic charge of 300 yen+0. yen per 1 packet| Monthly basic charge of 1,480 yen + 8 yen per 3 minutes| Number ofusers(March 2001)| 21. 70 million| 17. 25 million| Note: – Prices exclude monthly basic charges for cellular phone and fixed line telecom services. Price for the Internet is based on KDDI's IP service rates. – Number of users for the Internet is the number of contracts with Internet providers excluding mobile telecom carriers. Source:MPT, NTT DoCoMo, KDDI. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC2508/2009-5079